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ABSTRACT: Globalization and a rising migration have led to an increasing religious 
pluralism in Sweden. During the last decade, a large proportion of the migrants have been 
Muslims, especially immigrants arriving during the European refugee crisis in 2015. Islam, 
sometimes perceived as an un-European religion, is more visible than traditional Swedish 
Christianity, and Muslims are using their right to Freedom of religion and are expressing their 
faith publically and collectively. This is leading to new problems in Sweden, being one of the 
most secular countries in the world, where religion has become a private matter. This 
increasingly pluralistic religious landscape in Sweden has led to reactions from politicians in 
the parliament. This thesis investigates the politicization of religion during the period of 2011 
to 2020 - overlapping the European refugee crisis in 2015 - by examining parliamentary 
motions on the issue of religion, connecting it to the issue of migration. It uses quantitatively 
content analysis on parliamentary motions on religion, migration and Freedom of religion, 
and qualitatively idea analysis in order to analyze the motions on Freedom of religion, 
differentiating between Freedom from religion and Freedom to religion. The findings show 
that motions on the issue of religion (especially on Islam), on the issue of religion and 
migration combined and on Freedom of religion increased during 2011-2020, that the 
increase in Freedom of religion primarily was due to an increase in Freedom from religion, 
and that proposals in motions on Freedom of religion was increasing in strength and 
comprehensiveness. 
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Introduction 
The religious landscape in Sweden is changing. In line with the rest of Europe, globalization 
(as the complex and multi-layered concept it is) is making the world smaller and weakening 
national borders. Globalization and a rising migration have led to an increasing religious 
pluralism in Europe, where Islam stands out in the numbers as to where the growth is 
happening. The last decades of migration to Europe come with big challenges, and one of the 
most profound revolves around the increasing religious pluralism in the European countries 
migrants migrate to (Casanova, 2007, p. 61). The increasing religious pluralism in Sweden is 
a fact (Kühle, 2011, p. 208), and it has led to increased visibility of religion. And even though 
all European countries (Sweden included) is protecting the right for every individual to 
privately express his religious faith, as a human right, the difficulty appears when members of 
the perceived un-European religion of Islam is expressing it publicly and collectively 
(Casanova, 2007, p. 65). This has a stark contrast to traditional Christianity in Sweden. 
Therefore, the increasing visibility of Islam is leading to new problems for countries such as 
Sweden, with a historically a homogenous religious landscape (Casanova, 2007, p. 66-67). In 
Sweden, being one of the most secular countries in the world (Inglehart & Welzel, 2008), 
religion has become a private matter. Freedom of religion has a uniquely strong position, but 
with this homogenetic religious landscape, this freedom has not been controversial at all. 
With an increasing number of Muslims in the Swedish population – many being either 
immigrant themselves or having one or both parents as immigrants – the stance on Freedom 
of religion in Sweden is now being tested. Questions arise on what is to be considered an 
“acceptable” religion and “acceptable” religious practices, what is to be considered a private 
matter or a public matter with regards to religion, and where the limits of Freedom of religion 
is – and where the Freedom from religion should step in. Jonas Lindberg (2014, p. 568) 
argues that when globalization and migration lead to these changes, a development that 
sometimes happens at a rather quick pace, political parties need to react in some ways as the 
change affects the society in which the population lives in. It is, according to Lindberg (2014, 
p. 568) in this negotiation and re-negotiation of boundaries that religion might be transformed 
into a political matter, where religion is politicised. In the secular country of Sweden, 
globalization and increasing migration leads to a more pluralistic religious landscape. This 
new reality is affecting society, forcing politicians to act on it. This has led to - and will likely 
continue to lead to - an increased political debate on the issue of religion, and increased 
politicization of religion. 
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Aim and contribution 
The purpose of this study is to examine to what extent parties in the Swedish Parliament 
politicise religion due to the migration of Muslims. This study is intended to contribute to the 
understanding of how religion is used in politics and to be an addition to the ongoing 
scientific discussion on the “return” of religion in politics. It investigates the rapidly changing 
religious pluralistic landscape in Sweden, by connecting it to the issue of migration. Research 
on politicisation of religion in politics with a focus on Sweden and the Nordic countries has 
been conducted before, but not with the time span of 2011-2020, overlapping the European 
refugee crisis in 2015, analysing the possible correlation to the issue of migration. This focus 
on politicisation of religion in relation to migration during this time frame makes the thesis 
important and valuable. 
 
Outline 
This thesis will proceed as follows: First, for terms used in the study to be understood 
correctly, a section of definitions will be presented. Here, “Politics”, “Religion” and 
“Freedom of religion” (including “Freedom from religion” and “Freedom to religion”) will be 
defined. This is followed by the presentation of the theoretical framework, where religion in 
the secularized Sweden, Muslim migration, “Freedom to religion” and “Freedom from 
religion”, and politicisation are discussed. After this, the causal mechanism and the study's 
hypotheses are presented, followed by a review of the previous research on the topic. 
 
After this, the research design is introduced. First, the choice of material and time frame of 
the study is motivated. This is followed by a discussion on the methods used: Quantitative 
content analysis and qualitative idea analysis. This leads to the operationalization, where a 
more detailed instruction of how the methods will be used is presented, and a section 
stipulating the criteria for conclusions. The research design is finalized with a reflection on 
the study’s validity and reliability. The results will be presented using graphs and tables and 
will lead to the analysis where a more thorough discussion on the findings will be held. Here, 
the hypotheses will also be tested and discussed in light of the results. The study is finalized 
with a concluding discussion. 




Since this study is investigating religion in politics, both terms need to be defined in order for 
the reader to be clear on what the terms mean. The concept of politics will in this study be 
understood as “predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a 
society” (Easton, 1965, p. 50), meaning value distribution, both material ones - such as 
economic, natural resources, etc. - and non-material ones - such as norms on what is harmful 
or beneficial for society. 
 
Religion 
It is difficult to say the least to describe what religion is, hence there are numerous definitions 
with varying focus. James Beckford (2003, p.4) argues that religion is something that changes 
over time, that it does not have agency and is constantly open for negotiation and re-
negotiation, meaning it must be defined in the context it is used. Scholars using the concept 
of religion struggle with each other with two different traits of definition: "Religion" used as 
a substantial definition or "Religion" used as a functional definition. While the substantial 
definition is focused on what religion really is, with an emphasis on transcendent and supra-
empirical aspects, the functional definition is focusing on what religion does, meaning it can 
stir away from the central reference of transcendence by focusing on the social and 
psychological purposes it has (Beyer, 2006, p. 4). The definition that will be used in this 
thesis is a substantial definition, as it is more compatible with the aim of the study than a 
functional definition. "Religion" is hence understood as institutions, languages, symbols, 
beliefs, and activities – all used in different ways to handle the division between empirical 
and supra-empirical perceptions of reality. 
 
Freedom of religion    
Freedom of religion was first introduced in Sweden in 1951. This was the first time it was 
legally free to both practice the faith of your choice or not to practice any faith at all. This law 
included all of Sweden’s population, not only some specific groups or individuals as was 
done earlier. Freedom from religion (also called negative Freedom of religion), meaning your 
right to not practice or adhere to any religion, and Freedom to religion (also called positive 
Freedom of religion), meaning your right to practice and adhere to any religion, has since 
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been part of the Swedish Freedom of religion (Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfund, 2019, 
p. 11). In this study, Malin Wimelius’ (2002, p. 57), Associate professor and Deputy head of 
Department of Political Science at Umeå University, definition of Freedom to religion as the 
right to practice your faith the way you like, and Freedom from religion as the right to not be 
involved in any religious activity, will be used. Freedom from religion is not understood, as 
sometimes bluntly done, as the right to avoid facing religion in everyday life. Freedom of 
religion has today, together with the other fundamental laws on freedom and rights, a very 
strong position in Sweden. Wimelius (2002, p. 57) argues that the Swedish interpretation of 
Freedom of religion is focusing on the individual, hand in hand with how religion per se is 
understood in the country. This is a problem since Freedom of religion also is relevant on a 
collective basis. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
Sweden has ratified, the collective and public is much more prominent: 
  
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching. (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, article 18.1) 
  
This will all be kept in mind when analysing the material of Freedom of religion, including 
Freedom to religion and Freedom from religion. According to the Swedish Agency for 
Support to Faith Communities, in its report on the religious landscape in (Myndigheten för 
stöd till trossamfund, 2019, p. 15), regulations used by the Swedish state in its interpretation 
of Freedom of religion does not always match how the Swedish population is understanding 
religion and its role in the Swedish society. This will be an important standpoint in the study. 
This means that where religious issues are being argued for in conflict with other democratic 
values and rights, such as Freedom of speech or Freedom of expression, this discrepancy will 
be taken into account in the analysis.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework will be presented. First, a discussion on the state of 
religion in a secularized country such as Sweden will be held, where secularization, 
sacralization, and (de)privatisation of religion is highlighted. Secondly, Muslim migration to 
Europe and Sweden is outlined, where the refugee crisis in 2015, integration, and the 
increasing merging of “immigrants” and “Muslims” are discussed. Thirdly, a discussion on 
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the politicisation of migration and Freedom of religion together, and the collective identities 
and the experience of the threatening “otherness” of Muslim immigrants is held. Lastly, 
politicisation as the step-by-step process of lifting an issue on the agenda is discussed, where 
differentiation between politicisation of religion and religionization of politics is established. 
 
Religion in secularized Sweden 
The secularization theory and its claims that religion will decrease and eventually disappear 
in line with the increasing secularization and modernization have not held up entirely. There 
is an ongoing scientific debate whether or not the theory has any empirical support, with 
scholars arguing against it, for example see Rodney Stark’s ‘Secularization, rip’ (1999), and 
scholars arguing for it, for example see Steve Bruce’s ‘God is dead: Secularization in the 
West’ (2002). Arguably secularization cannot be taken for granted, it looks different in 
different parts of the world. For example, at the end of the 20th century, many secular 
regimes such as Iran, India, and in the east and central Europe fell and were replaced with 
political structures that accepted more influence from religious actors. In line with that, one 
could argue that at least secularization has decreased in speed, and religion has increased its 
influence in politics. But the scientific discussion on the secularization theory is not black and 
white. José Casanova (1994, p. 7) is critical of the traditional stance of the secularization 
theory, but does not think it should be abandoned. According to Casanova (2007, p. 64), the 
Western Europe’s secularization was a self-fulfilling prophecy in line with the secularization 
paradigm accompanied by a secularist self-understanding that the decline of religious 
affiliation was not only normal and modern but a natural progressive transformation of social 
change. In hand with the increasing modern societies was secularization. Casanova (2001, p. 
13788) defines secularization as the result of three different subtheses: (1) as a differentiation 
of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, (2) a decrease in both religious 
practices and religious beliefs, and (3) marginalization and privatisation of religion, away 
from the public sphere. Modern society and its increased concentration of populations have 
led to increased competition and an increased need for the population to specialize in work. 
In complex modern societies, religion has lost its role to contribute with values. (Casanova, 
2001, p. 13788-13789). Religion once was a sacred canopy (Berger, 1967), but not anymore. 
  
Looking at Sweden, established religions have lost many members and lost the activity of the 
members they still have, while at the same time there has been a growing interest in 
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spirituality on an individual level (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 41). Casanova (2007, p. 63) 
argues that with this in mind, the use of secularization should be replaced with “unchurching” 
and of “religious individualization”. Grace Davie (1994) uses the term “believing without 
belonging” to capture this. But the high levels of members in churches and the high amount 
of people identifying as Christians means the opposite could also be argued for, just as 
Danièle Hervieu‐Léger (2004) does when she uses the term “belonging without believing”. 
Some scholars argue that religiosity has not died in the Swedish society, it has just 
transformed from being a public matter to a private matter where individuals turn to religion 
in order to find meaning in their lives as they live in a secularized society (Geels & 
Wikström, 2017). This concept, called “sacralization” does, unlike the secularization theory, 
acknowledge that religiosity still exists in large quantities, even in Sweden, being one of the 
most secular countries in the world (Inglehart & Welzel, 2008). It has just changed form, 
from traditional religions to spirituality, and shape, from public to private. 
  
Casanova (1994, p. 40-41) does not oppose this trend of privatisation of religion, but presents 
an opposing trend of ‘de-privatisation’ of religion occurring simultaneously. Even if religious 
beliefs and practices are declining globally, a fact contested and difficult to measure, it would 
not mean that the world is not religious anymore. This seemingly contradicting fact is true 
according to Casanova due to the self-fulfilling prophecy of secularization, earlier discussed. 
Functional differentiation leads to that religion loses its historic role and that it becomes a 
private matter (Casanova, 1994), but this trend has though been accompanied by an opposing 
trend, one of ‘de-privatisation’ of religion, which has been ongoing since the 1970s 
(Casanova, 1994, p. 40-41). 
 
Muslim migration 
It could be argued that when immigration to Sweden increases from countries with a big 
proportion of the population adhering to a religion other than Christianity, the religious 
landscape in Sweden becomes more pluralistic. During the last decade, overlapping the 
European refugee crisis in 2015, this is exactly what has happened. Immigrants from the 
countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, all with over 90% Muslim population, 
increased rapidly due to unstable states and conflicts, but also because of emerging 
globalization. But the increase of the Muslim population in European countries is not a 2010s 
phenomenon. Islam has for some decades now been, and most likely still is, the fastest 
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growing religion in Europe, and Muslims are the second-largest religious group in many 
European countries - such as France, Germany, and The UK (Nielsen, 1999, Klausen, 2006, 
Cherribi, 2003). At the same time, anti-immigrant rhetoric and prejudice are especially 
focused on Muslims and Islam in Europe (Koopmans, 1996; Koopmans & Stratham, 1999). 
Of course, it is unknown how religious people are, which does not only concern Muslims. 
But with that said, Norris and Inglehart (2004, p. 79, 217) argue that immigrants tend to be 
more religious when living in precarious surroundings in this age of globalization. 
  
Sam Cherribi (2007, p. 113) argues that there has been a variety of integration policies in 
Europe, all towards increasing ethnic and religious pluralism, but that the general outcome 
has been disappointing. The integration of Muslim religious minorities into European 
countries has not been successful. In Cherribi’s study (2007), the findings show that even 
though there is a growing acceptance within the academic sphere that religion needs to be 
incorporated and paid attention to, the knowledge of how Muslims are perceived as a 
problem is limited. The study also shows that there is a strong convergence in the political 
spectrum in how the issues of how to integrate Muslims into European countries are 
constructed. In the scientific field, three different categories map the issue of Muslim 
migration to European countries (Koopmans & Statham, 2000): “Ethnic” or “exclusive”, 
making it very difficult for Muslims to integrate. Switzerland and Austria are two countries 
characterizing this. “Assimilationist”, where integration is possible but where cultural 
difference is not recognized. Here France is a typical example. And “pluralist”, where formal 
citizenship is fairly easy and where the right to cultural difference is highlighted. Here Britain 
and the Netherlands are examples. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (2000) criticise these 
categories, arguing that they are simplifying the issue. Especially the “pluralist” type, where 
the numerous policy instruments used to tackle discrimination based on cultural, racial, or 
ethnic differences sometimes just reinforces the discrimination instead, increasing the 
informality of it. Koopmans and Statham (2000, p. 27) exemplify this with an example from 
The Netherlands, where: “state policies have reinforced the image of migrants as a 
problematic, disadvantaged category in need of constant state assistance — not only in the 
eyes of the majority population, but also in those of many migrants and their representative 
organizations.’’ 
  
Casanova (2007, p. 62) argues that in Europe, “the immigrant, the religious, the racial, and 
the socioeconomic disprivileged other all tend to coincide”. A large part of the immigrants in 
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many European countries are Muslims, and the vast majority of Muslims in the countries are 
immigrants. It is also often these people that are the socioeconomic disprivileged in European 
societies. This way of identifying immigrants as Muslims becomes even more prominent 
when Muslim immigrants arriving from the same country establish themselves in one specific 
country, city, or area (Cesari, 2004; Vertovec & Peach, 1997; Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto, & 
Nielsen, 2003). 
 
Freedom to religion and Freedom from religion 
Marie Demker (2018), Professor at the Department of Political Science and Dean at the 
Faculty of Humanities, is discussing the changing public opinion on migration in Sweden and 
sees that it has a close correlation with the public opinion on Freedom of religion. According 
to Demker (2018), Freedom of religion and migration are two issues that are being politicised 
together. In line with the migration issue becoming more and more central for the Swedish 
public opinion, the question of Freedom of religion has followed. Analysing Swedish public 
opinion she has come to the understanding that religion has increased its role considerably in 
relation to the opposition against migration and multiculturalism. The same group of people 
that sees migration as a threat, also sees the Freedom of religion in Sweden being threatened 
while at the same time being strongly negative towards immigrants' right to Freedom of 
religion. This stance is highlighting the question of how they understand Freedom of religion 
in the first place (Demker, 2018). Demker argues that it is most likely that the reason for this 
seemingly paradoxical stance is that they perceive that it is the immigrants that are 
threatening the Freedom of religion in Sweden, with its different cultures, religion, and ways 
of life and most primarily this regards Muslim immigrants. Hence, it is not Freedom of 
religion as a principle that is threatened, but rather the Freedom of religion for those who are 
either traditional Swedish Christians or not adhering to any religion at all that is threatened 
(Demker, 2018). 
  
Casanova (2007, p. 66-67) agrees, as he argues that even though European societies usually 
are tolerant towards the individual’s right to Freedom of religion, the states that have 
pressured religious people to practice their faith in private are the same states that have 
difficulty in recognising any role for religion in public life or for any collective group 
identities forming in the name of religion. 
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Therefore, the problems posed by the incorporation of Muslim immigrants become consciously or 
unconsciously associated with seemingly related and vexatious issues concerning the role of religion in 
the public sphere, which European societies assumed they had already solved according to the liberal, 
secular norm of privatization of religion. (Casanova, 2007, p. 67) 
  
These collective identities formed by Muslim migrants is seen as a religious otherness as it is 
neither Christian, European nor secular. Ola Sigurdson (2009) argues that the secularisation 
of the society has led to religion and religious practice being put aside to the private sphere of 
society, leading to that migrated religions such as Islam with a much more public religious 
practice is considered as threatening. 
 
Politicisation 
The politicisation of an issue by a political party could be said to happen when the party 
expects the decisions to affect the voters’ opinions. John W Kingdon (2011, p. 196-198) 
defines politicisation as a process of gradually setting the future agenda. If a specific disaster 
or crisis, such as the European refugee crisis in 2015, is endangering values it can be turned 
into a politicised problem. The concept of politicisation will in this study be understood in 
line with how Kingdon (2011, p. 197-198) understands it: as a step-by-step process of 
changing the agenda, where a crisis often is the starting point. The event and the 
consequences of it may lead to a focus on specific conditions, which if seen to threaten 
important values could be turned into a problem. The more essential the threat is, the higher 
the possibility that the problem might climb on the political agenda. The problem is also more 
likely to be categorized as a specific problem if possible. In line with this definition of 
politicisation, Jonas Hinnfors (1992) describes a step-by-step strategy that politicians use in 
order to politicise an issue. Step one is the construction of standpoints on the issue, step two 
is the consideration of the likeliness of attracting more voters in the competition on the issue 
with other parties, step three is the consideration of how likely members of the party will 
agree on the issue, and step four is the evaluation on the likeliness of succeeding in the 
change they want to make on the issue, being very different depending on the size of the 
party. 
  
Lastly, it is important to understand and separate the difference between when religion re-
emerges into politics and when religion is being politicised. When a religious actor, such as a 
religious organisation or more specifically a person in the role as a representative of a 
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religious organisation, etc., is taken part in politics in order to transform society in the ways 
of the religion, it is an example of the former (Lindberg, 2015, p. 20). Ivanescu (2010, p. 313, 
322-323) conceptualize it as ‘religionization of politics’, and explain it with the example of 
when religion has both presence and influence in politics, such as when politicians consult 
religious actors on issues regarding the religion, hence making the religion both an object and 
a subject. But when non-religious actors, such as politicians or political parties, are using 
religion in politics it is an example of the latter. It is this, when religion becomes politicised, 
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Causal mechanism and hypotheses 
This study investigates whether or not an increased level of migration from countries with a 
high level of Muslim population to Sweden with its secular context affects the political 
parties' politicisation of religion. The causal mechanism, therefore, looks like this: 
  
Figure 1. Causal mechanism 
 
 
In order to investigate whether or not there is any validity to this causal mechanism, and with 
a basis in the theoretical framework, three hypotheses (having the role of research questions 
in this thesis) are stipulated in advance: 
 
1. The parliament parties´ reference to religion in general, and to other religions than 
Christianity in particular, has increased. 
2. The parliament parties’ reference to religion has been increasingly related to the issue 
of migration. 
3. The parliament parties’ references to Freedom of religion has increased, and the 
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Previous Research 
Politicisation of religion has been investigated before. Jonas Lindberg (2014), Doctor of 
Philosophy, studied changes in how politicians politicised religion in Scandinavia during 
1988-1989, 1998-1999, and 2008-2009 through looking at parliamentary debates in the 
Scandinavian states. His main take from the study was that there was a substantial change to 
be found in Norway and Denmark, but not in Sweden. The number of speeches and debates, 
and the amount in which politicians problematized the issue of religion increased in these two 
countries mainly due to right-wing populist parties in their parliament. The fact that Sweden 
did not have such a party in the parliament until 2010 is likely, according to Lindberg, the 
reason for the different outcome of politicisation of religion in Lindberg's study (2014, p. 
565). Lindberg concludes that globalization has had an impact on the politicisation of religion 
in Scandinavia during the period of 1988-2009, and hence that higher levels of migration to 
Sweden would presumably lead to even more politicisation. He found no such evidence, but 
rather that the emergence of right-wing populist parties was the driving force to this 
development (Lindberg, 2014, p. 581). It could hence be assumed that the level of 
politicisation of religion started to increase in Sweden when the Sweden Democrats entered 
the Parliament, which was in 2010. 
  
Carolina Invanescu’s (2010, p. 322), Doctor of Humanities at the University of Amsterdam, 
study on politicisation of religion in the Netherlands with a focus on Islam and Muslims 
showed that even though Islam from the nation-state’s point of view is understood as a public 
and visible religion, and hence as a threat to secularism, it is the democratic principles, all 
part of the essence of liberal western civilization, and the willingness of integration of 
immigrants that leads to politicisation of religion. She argued that Muslims in the Netherlands 
in 2004 were portrayed as impossible to integrate into a secular and modern society because 
they maintained their roots in religion and tradition (Invanescu, 2010, p. 315). When 
discussing Islam’s take on individual and collective identity, and how migrants and 
minorities is concerning through the eyes of the nation-state, Invanescu argues that: 
  
(…) when transformed into policy practice, the voice of religion is distorted by other parallel politicised 
discussions. Entangled in the discussion about Islam are concerns about migration and integration of 
migrants and their descendants, state security concerns and changes in the structure of the nation-state 
itself. (Ivanescu, 2010, p. 312) 
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Migration, especially Muslim migration, is challenging for the nation-state because it sparks a 
religious revival. The separation of the religious sphere and the private sphere, and the 
marginalization of religion, is challenged by migrants and minorities expressing their 
religious views public and collective (Ivanescu, 2010, p. 311-312). 
  
In Göran Gustavsson’s, Professor of Sociology of Religion and Honorary Doctor of Theology 
at Lund University, research from 1985, he investigated religious change in Nordic countries 
during 1930-1980. The finding showed that globalization, with migration included, had 
limited or no impact at all on the religious change occurring in Nordic countries during those 
50 years (Gustavsson, 1985). This was early research, but most previous literature that covers 
the European refugee crisis does not take religion into consideration. And most research on 
religion does not take the European refugee crisis into account. This is also what Ulrich 
Schmiedel and Graeme Smith argue (2018, p. 5-6), in their anthology covering exactly that. 
In the anthology, Sturla J. Stålsett investigated the Norweigian public policy on religion and 
found that the policy mostly focused on how integration was affected by the immigrants' 
religiosity, and concluded that this area was not substantiated enough but rather led to “the 
fear of the faith of the other” (Stålsett, 2018, p. 119). Johan Cato (2012) has studied how the 
picture of Islam and Muslims were perceived and constructed in Swedish politics between 
1975 and 2010. During the 90s, there were several changes to this picture. Political issues 
around Muslim migrants increased in numbers and Muslim migrants were more polarized 
than before, which was a reaction to increased Muslim migration. Cato (2012, p. 268, authors 
translation) mentions “The bill on active refugee and immigration policy” as an example 
where Muslims were portrayed as a threat to Swedish norms and values. During this decade, 
Muslim immigrants were also portrayed as a group with specific demands, not only hindering 
integration but also increasing confrontation with native Swedes. During the first decade of 
the 21st century, the picture of Islam and Muslims in Swedish politics continued to change. 
Muslims and antisemitism were more frequently connected, and this hatred towards Jews was 
pictured as a part of the general Muslim identity, - for example not separating Islamists 
fundamentalists from liberal Muslims - increasing scepticism towards Muslims in the 
country. This scepticism was also an issue that increased in visibility during this decade 
(Cato, 2012, p. 268-274). 
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Research Design and Methods 
In this chapter, the research design will be introduced. First, the choice of parliamentary 
motions as material and the time frame of 2011-2020 will be motivated. Second, the choice 
of using a ‘mixed method’ of quantitative content analysis and qualitative idea analysis will 
be described and operationalized. This will be followed by an outline of the criteria for 
drawing conclusions. Lastly, some reflections on the study’s validity and reliability will be 
held. 
 
Material and time frame 
Parliamentary motions can be put forward by any elected politician to the Swedish parliament 
during a specific time in the fall every year. One or several politicians can sign it, from the 
same or different parties, and it does not necessarily have to be the official standpoint from 
the party/parties. This makes parliamentary motions a good source of data to use in this study 
since there is more variance to it, meaning it is easier to find nuances and trends in how 
politicians in the Parliament are discussing the issue of religion. Using for instance 
parliamentary debates or official party documents such as election manifestos or party 
programs would mean a more clear-cut official standpoint of the party, but probably miss 
more latent changes in opinion in the parties. Motions are also proposals for bills, meaning it 
is not only political strategies before elections or political speeches in debates, it is proposals 
for changing the law. Parliament motions from 2011 to 2020 will be included in the data. 
This period is chosen because it covers the European refugee crisis in 2015, making it 
possible to investigate any correlation to this event. Including a few years before and after 
2015 makes it more likely to detect any change, and especially the years after 2015 since the 
change might not have happened directly after the European refugee crisis in 2015. 
 
Method 
To examine the material collected, and to be able to test the three hypotheses, two different 
methods will be used. First, in order to test the first and the second hypotheses, and partly the 
third hypothesis, I will conduct a quantitative content analysis. Second, in order to finalize 
the testing of the third hypothesis, I will conduct a qualitative idea analysis. The content 
analysis will be used to cover a larger amount of parliament motions, while the idea analysis 
will focus more narrowly in a qualitative essence. When using already existing political 
material, such as parliamentary motions, idea analys is a useful method for this purpose  
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(Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 138). Many scholars are arguing that because quantitative and 
qualitative studies are so different, a combination of them both is an advantage (Teorell & 
Svensson, 2007, p. 273-275). This ‘mixed methods’ is suggested because of its ability to 
answer research questions that either quantitative or qualitative studies can by itself, since it 
offers a greater variety of viewpoints with for instance stronger inferences (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2003, p. 10-15). Texts are already qualitative to begin with, so including a 
quantitative approach to the method will add some systematisation (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 
88-90). Since the study will test hypotheses and hence try to find inferences that proceed 
from generalization to particular, the study has a deductive approach. 
 
Quantitative content analysis 
Quantitative content analysis is used on large amounts of data, and when the researcher is 
putting a value on the amount of something in the material that is considered to be of 
importance outside of the material. The research question, or in this case the hypotheses, are 
often drawn upon theory and are the base for the analytical tool (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 
50). The fundamental definition of content analysis used in this study will be the one 
stipulated by Klaus Krippendorf (2013, p. 24-25): “Content analysis is a research technique 
for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the 
contexts of their use”, as content “… emerge in the process of a researcher analysing a text 
relative to a particular context”. All content analysis requires coding. How that coding 
should be done depends on if the content analysis is quantitative or qualitative, and on what 
the researcher is looking for. In qualitative content analysis, the coding could be done 
manually. This requires that the researcher reads all the material used (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, 
p. 58). In this study, quantitative content analysis is going to be used since a large amount of 
data will be covered, where a specific set of keywords are looked for. Hence, computerized 
coding will be conducted. Computerized coding means in this study that I will search for 
specific words or combinations of words over a large amount of material, using the Swedish 
government’s database on parliamentary motions. The words and combination of words are 
the recording units and works as the analytical tool. Motions consisting of these words or 
combinations of words are the sampling units (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 59-60). The result of 
the coding is later best presented in a chart showing frequencies (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 
63). A more detailed description of the process in this study is found in the paragraph 
covering “operationalization” later in this chapter. 
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There are critical notions to take into consideration regarding content analysis. First, it is not 
always of interest to measure quantities. Just because something is represented more often, 
does not necessarily mean that it has greater importance than something less represented. 
Therefore, it is important for the researcher to justify why the amount is of interest. There is 
also a risk that the researcher misses the latent message while conducting a content analysis, 
since the focus is on shallow messages - what is explicitly stated. While what is not said 
could be the implicit message, it could also just be an obvious fact that hence does not need 
to be stated. Other text analysis, such as discourse analysis, is better suited to discover latent 
messages. The coding also makes it possible for the researcher to miss what the main plot is 
in the data, because the focus is on specific keywords. This, and the fact that the recording 
units are taken from its context could lead to validation problems (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 
79-81). Many of these issues regarding content analysis are in this study mitigated with the 
inclusion of qualitative idea analysis. 
 
Qualitative idea analysis 
The “idea” in idea analysis does not include a random thought that happened to pop up in an 
individual's head. The term is rather used for constructed thoughts of ideas that are 
sustainable over a longer period of time, which are shared between people in groups and that 
have a role in guiding how the people in the group acts. Basically, it is ideas as social 
phenomena that are of interest, phenomena that lead to real consequences in society 
(Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 133-134). The fact that these ideas are of interest in research 
means that the researcher perceives people and their language as meaning-making, an 
hermeneutic insight that is common in Social Science research (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 
139). 
  
In this study, I will conduct an idea analysis with the purpose to explain (Bergström & Svärd, 
2018, p. 140-144). There is no interest in describing something in the material that it does not 
explain itself, or to introduce an alternative interpretation, hence is the purpose not to 
describe. Neither is the purpose to criticise, since I am not interested in deciding whether or 
not the ideas in the material are scientifically sustainable or not, which is the focus in 
conducting a critical idea analysis (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 143-144). What is of interest 
in this study is the origin of the ideas, what consequences the ideas might lead to, and how 
they connect to other events, processes, and structures in society (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, 
p. 142). Hence is the purpose of this study to explain, which will be done with the use of a 
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clear design. In this study, different typologies will form the analytical tool which will be 
used in the analysis in order to find the essential aspects of the phenomenon of interest in the 
material. Conducting an analysis with typological classification requires that the components 
of the typologies are formed in a way making it possible to operationalize, that they can be 
found in the material, and that the classification is based on clear principles (Esaiasson, et. al., 
2012, p. 137-138). The typologies also need to be mutually exclusive - meaning the findings 
should as far as possible fit into one category and not another - and collectively exhaustive - 
meaning the findings should as far as possible fit into any category and not be left out 
(Collier, Laporte & Seawright, 2008, p. 6). Collectively exhaustive typologies are easiest 
formed when they logically exhaust each other, such as direct-indirect, up-down, in-out, and 
vertical-horizontal. If that is not the case, and collective exhaustive typologies are not 
possible, at least they need to be as covering as possible (Esaiasson, et. al., 2012, p. 139). 
  
It is important for the researcher to understand and to be open with the fact that an idea 
analysis always includes some level of interpretation of the material, and that the picture 
drawn by the analysis therefore never is a neutral and completely objective fact. The 
descriptive idea analysis always includes some argumentation, since the interpretation is the 
researcher’s and might not be shared by others (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 141). This is an 
important fact that the researcher needs to be aware of and open with. 
 
Operationalization 
As discussed earlier, I will use a ‘mixed method’ in this study, where a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative aspects will be drawn upon. The first two hypotheses are going to 
be tested quantitatively, while the third hypothesis will be tested both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. 
  
In order to test the first hypothesis, I will operationalize the procedure as follows: First I use 
specific keywords on religion to find motions on the issue of religion, in order to detect any 
change in volume between 2011 and 2020. The keywords chosen are inspired by how the 
NOREL project set up their set of keywords in their research on religion in Nordic states1. I 
																																								 																				
1	Keywords on “Religion”, all translated into Swedish (using a * means that all forms of the word have 
been taken accounted for): religi*, Islam*, Muslim*, Christian*, Jew*, Hindu*, Buddhis*, church*, 
mosque*, synagogue*, temple, “The Salvation Army”, pentacostal, "Jehovah's Witnesses", Jesus, 
God, Prophet, Buddha, Brahma, Allah, bishop*, priest*, pastor*, imam*, puraji*, purohit*, deacon*, 
rabbi*, congregation*, worship*, prayer, bible*, quran*, satanis*, angels, meditation, spirit*, "new age", 
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also separate “Christianity”, “Islam” and “Judaism” into three different categories. The 
percentage of motions on these categories is expected to be different, possibly making a 
direct comparison somewhat problematic. Even so, the percentage increase in each category 
will be compared, since the expectation is that it still holds value. In order to test the second 
hypothesis, keywords on the issue of migration will be added2. This makes it possible to see 
how many of the motions on the issue of religion that are connected to the issue of migration, 
and how this combination increases or not during the time frame used. 
  
In order to test the third hypothesis, I will operationalize the procedure as follows: First I look 
at the amount of parliament motions on “Freedom of religion” in order to see if there is any 
increase during the period investigated3. Secondly, a qualitative idea analysis will be 
conducted. This is necessary since Freedom to religion and Freedom from religion is not 
always measured best quantitatively. The distinction between them is sometimes too complex 
in order to capture change using numeric values. For instance, critics of Freedom from 
religion will in quantitative measures mean a higher ratio on Freedom from religion, but in 
reality, it is rather a case for Freedom to religion, which would have been understood with a 
qualitative study. Hence, a qualitative analysis where words are used instead of numbers 
increases the reliability of the study. The qualitative idea analysis will begin with a strategic 
sampling of the motions on “Freedom of religion”, using centrality, or what Martyn 
Denscombe (2010, p. 34-36) calls purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is well suited for 
the qualitative part of this study since it operates on the idea that hand-picked sampling based 
on relevance increases the chance of finding the best valued data. In the case of this study, 
every year must be represented in the data, making it possible to understand the possible 
change occurring after 2015. Purposive sampling is also useful in the qualitative part of this 
study since it makes it possible to focus more narrowly on the parts of the collected data on 
“Freedom of religion”. The data, collected quantitatively, will probably have a variety of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
hijab, niqab, burqa, cross, “the star of david”, "the crescent and star”, kippa, aum, dharmacakra, 
dhammacakka, “the dharma wheel”, Ramadan, "Yom kippur", Chanukka, holy, secular*, lifestance, 
humanis*, atheis* 
2	Keywords on “Migration”, all translated into Swedish: migra*, immigr*, emigr*, refuge*, asylum*, 
”unaccompanied minors”, ”residence permit”, citizenship, immigrant*, ”quota refuge*”, "family 
reunification”, integrat*, assimilat* 
3	Keywords on “Freedom of religion”, all translated into Swedish: “Freedom of religion”, ” Freedom 
from religion”, ”Freedom to religion”, “negative freedom”, “positive freedom” 
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primary focus issues, all already accounted for in the quantitative analysis. Purposive 
sampling also makes it possible to single out the parliamentary motions that are more 
outstanding, for instance, the ones signed by politicians with important positions. Purposive 
sampling on the data that has Freedom of religion as the primary focus issue will broaden the 
overall quality of the study. 
 
The motions sampled will then be separated into five different categories, ordered by 
typological classification. The five categories are: (1) Explicit Freedom to religion, (2) 
Explicit Freedom from religion, (3) Implicit Freedom to religion, (4) Implicit Freedom from 
religion, and (5) Freedom of religion in general (where there is no discernible tendency for 
either Freedom to religion or Freedom from religion). This is where the second motive for a 
qualitative study comes in. Measuring quantities does not grasp the magnitude of the data 
either, meaning all motions mentioning Freedom from religion or Freedom to religion are 
valued equally. Using qualitative analysis, it is possible to measure the extent of the motions - 
the different strength and comprehensiveness of the different motions used in the study. The 
differentiation between Freedom from religion and Freedom to religion needs to be clear. The 
meaning of Freedom from religion is the right to not adhere to any religion, to not be forced 
into any religion, and to not be forced to stay within any religion. An increasing emphasis on 
prohibition is in this study understood as an expression of Freedom from religion. The 
meaning of Freedom to religion is the right to adhere to any religion of your choice, the right 
to be able to express your religion in private or in public, by yourself or together with others, 
and to do this without persecution in any way. An increasing emphasis on rights is in this 
study understood as an expression of Freedom to religion. An analytic tool formed by two 
dimensions will be used to find the change, a tool described well by Bergström & Svärd 
(2018, p. 153-155). The first dimension will measure the strength of the motions (that is how 
strong the proposals of prohibitions or rights are) and the second dimension will measure the 
comprehensiveness of the motions (that is how comprehensive the proposals of prohibitions 
or rights are), as seen in Figure 2. The dimension of “strength” is measuring to what extent 
the proposals in the motions are demanding, and the dimension of “comprehensiveness” is 
measuring how wide the proposals in the motion will affect the population. For instance, the 
proposal of prohibiting a minor branch of a small religion with a few members in Sweden is 
high on the dimension of “strength” since the people adhering to the faith cannot exercise 
their Freedom of religion anymore, but low on the dimension of “comprehensiveness” since it 
will not affect many people. On the opposite, making a minor change on how the subject of 
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religion is taught in elementary school across the country is high on the dimension of 
“comprehensiveness” since all children are affected by the change, but low on the dimension 
of “strength” since the change is so small that not much really changes in reality. 
  
Figure 2. Dimensions on "Strength" and "Comprehensiveness" 
 
  
By analyzing the motions with the help of this analytic tool, I will be able to understand if 
there is a qualitative change in the motions on Freedom of religion. The Swedish 
interpretation of Freedom of religion, which focuses on the individual and the private rather 
than on the collective and the public (as discussed earlier in the paragraph on the definition of 
Freedom of religion), will be kept in mind during the analysis. This could, for instance, be 
issues on Islamic call to prayer, religious clothing in public, and prayer during working hours 
- all being part of the public and political debate in Sweden during the last few years. While 
the differentiation between Freedom from religion and Freedom to religion is clear, there are 
still gray areas within both of them. This is where this study expects to find a change towards 
more strength and more comprehensiveness, meaning a move upward and rightward in the 
graph seen in Figure 2. The change is also expected to be found especially in Freedom from 
religion due to the perception of Islam as a threat and Muslims as the threatening “otherness”, 
as earlier discussed. 
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Criteria for drawing conclusions 
As outlined above, the first and second hypotheses are tested quantitatively, and the third is 
tested both quantitatively and qualitatively. In order to investigate if the amount of motions 
on “Religion”, “Christianity”, “Islam”, “Judaism”, “Religion” and “Migration”, and on 
“Freedom of religion” did increase between 2011 and 2020, the findings need to be done 
compared with the development of the total amount of motions in the Swedish Parliament 
every year. If the increase of parliamentary motions overall were the same as the increase of 
parliamentary motions in each sampling unit, the increase would not be significant at all. 
Hence, the change in the total amount of motions in each sampling unit is not of interest, but 
only the percentage increase of the total amount of parliamentary motions each year. A 
percentage increase in each of the sampling units is understood as an increased politicisation 
of religion, and a percentage increase in “Islam” and in “Religion” and “Migration” 
combined is understood as an increasing correlation between the issues of religion and 
migration. 
  
The criteria for drawing conclusions from the qualitative study is based on the change in 
strength and comprehensiveness in the motions of Freedom of religion, where emphasis on 
rights is understood as Freedom to religion, and emphasis on prohibition is understood as 
Freedom from Religion, in line with the definitions of Freedom to religion and Freedom from 
religion earlier outlined in this study. As discussed earlier, here the researcher needs to be 
aware and open with the fact that idea analysis always includes a level of interpretation and 
argumentation. The material and the picture drawn by the researcher are not neutral nor 
completely objective, and might not be shared by others (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 141). 
In this study, a clear analytical tool, transparency, and the complimentary use of quantitative 
content analysis are mitigating this problem. An increasing strength and comprehensiveness 
on rights in Freedom to religion and on prohibition in Freedom from religion is understood as 
an increased politicisation of religion, and higher growth in emphasis on Freedom from 
religion is understood as an increasing correlation between the issues of religion and 
migration. 
 
Validity and reliability 
In order to achieve a high level of validity and reliability in research, actions must be taken to 
minimize systemic and non-systemic measuring problems (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 55-
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57). Validity could be defined in two different ways: Concept validity - that the theory is 
matching the operationalization of the analytical tool, leading to the absence of systematic 
errors; and Results validity - that the study really is measuring what it is intended to measure 
(Esaiasson, et. al., p. 55-60). If the concept validity is high and the reliability is high, meaning 
the absence of un-systematic or randomized errors, the results validity is also high, and the 
results are a measurement of what the study wanted to measure (Esaiasson, et. al., 2012, p. 
63-65). Using both qualitative and quantitative aspects in the study increases both the validity 
and the reliability of the results. Qualitative methods focus on a smaller number of data and 
therefore bring depth to the analysis, increasing the validity. Quantitative methods focus on a 
bigger amount of data and therefore bring width to the analysis, increasing the reliability 
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Results 
In this chapter, the results of the data will be presented. First, the data on parliamentary 
motions in total will be presented and discussed, making it possible for the rest of the 
quantitative data to be compared with it. Secondly, the coding conducted through quantitative 
content analysis will be in focus, where the data on religion and migration will be presented 
with graphs, making the data more visual and therefore easier to understand. Lastly, I will 
turn the focus to the qualitative idea analysis, where the data on “Freedom of religion'' will be 
presented and examined with a table, and the qualitative change in strength and 
comprehensiveness in the motions of “Freedom from religion” (prohibition) and of “Freedom 
to Religion” (rights) will be presented with the help of quotes from the motions. In the next 
chapter, an analysis of the findings will be conducted. 
 
	
Figure 3. Total amount of motions in the Swedish Parliament, from 2011 to 2020 
  
The amount of motions in the Swedish parliament has been increasing during the last decade, 
as seen in Figure 3. From 2011 to 2020, the amount increased by 12.0%. But the data also 
show that the amount was lowest the year of a general election (in 2014 and 2018) and then 
increasing every year until the top the year before a general election (in 2013 and 2017). This 
made the percentage increase from the year 2011 to the year 2020 skewed since 2011 is a 
year after a general election whilst 2020 is right in between two general elections. While 
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starting the measuring in 2012, the increase was therefore a bit smaller, but still an increase of 
8.4%. This increase in percent is only presented as an indication of the overall increase. It 
should not be compared to the upcoming data presented, as that is the percentage of the total 





Figure 4. Share of parliamentary motions on "Religion" of the total amount of parliamentary 
motions, from 2011 to 2020 
 
Looking at the data on parliamentary motions on “Religion”, presented in Figure 4, there is a 
visible increase during the last decade. In 2011, 35.28% of the total amount of motions 
referred to “Religion”, increasing to 41.29% in 2020. This means an percentage increased by 
17.04% from 2011 to 2020.  As seen in Figure 4, the percentage of motions saw a minor 
decrease from 2011 to 2014, before it in 2015 started to increase. This increase continued 
every year up to 2020, slowing down a bit in the last two years. 
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Figure 5. Share of parliamentary motions on "Christianity" of the total amount of 
parliamentary motions, from 2011 to 2020 
 
So far so clear that the issue of religion is getting more attention in parliamentary motions. 
But in order to understand if there is any big difference between different religions, three 
different coding measurements were required. Here I separated “Christianity”, “Islam” and 
“Judaism” from each other and looked at their trend over the last decade. First, 
“Christianity”, presented in Figure 5, has increased from 8.26% in 2011 to 9.91% in 2020, 
which means an increase by 19,98%. The increase was not very stable but had three years 
where most of it accrued - 2013, 2015, and 2020. It also saw a drastic decrease in 2014 and a 
slowly decreasing tendency from 2016 to 2018. 
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Figure 6. Share of parliamentary motions on "Islam" of the total amount of parliamentary 
motions from 2011 to 2020 
 
Second, looking at the results from “Islam”, presented in Figure 6, a clearly increasing trend 
is visible. The percentage increased from 1.07% in 2011 to 3.38% in 2020, which means an 
increase of 174.8%. The increase is rather stable, with two years of major increase (2015 and 
2018) and two years of minor decrease (2017 and 2019). The increase in percentage needs to 
be compared with the increase in percentage of “Christianity” with care since the percentage 
is at a much lower level. Even so, the increase in motions on “Islam” is arguably drastic. 
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Figure 7. Share of parliamentary motions on "Judaism" of the total amount of parliamentary 
motions from 2011 to 2020 
 
Lastly, investigating the data on “Judaism”, presented in Figure 7, the increasing trend is 
visible. From a percentage of 0.59% in 2011 to a percentage of 1.35% in 2020, means an 
increase of 128.81%. As seen in Figure 7, the percentage was stable between 2011 to 2016 
and saw the increase drastically start in 2018. The percentage more than doubled between 
2016 and 2018. The increase in percentage on “Judaism” starts from even lower levels than 
on “Islam”, but the percentage of change is still not as high. Even so, there is arguably a 
rather drastic increase in the last decade regarding motions on “Judaism”. 
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Figure 8. Share of parliamentary motions on "Religion" and "Migration" of the total amount 
of parliamentary motions from 2011 to 2020 
 
The issue of religion is clearly getting more attention in parliamentary motions during the last 
decade, and the increasing trend is visible in all three religions measured. In order to 
investigate if the issue of religion is increasingly related to the issue of migration, the 
recording units which combines the keywords on “Religion” and keywords on “Migration” 
was used. As presented in Figure 8, the percentage increased from 5.95% in 2011 to 10.23% 
in 2020, meaning an increase of 71.93%. Between 2011 and 2014 the percentage decreased, 
before drastically increasing in 2015. Between 2014 and 2015 the percentage increase from 
5.56% to 12.4%, meaning an increase of 123.02%. In 2016 it decreased to a percentage of 
9.42% and has been fairly stable until 2020. This development arguably has a strong 
correlation to the European refugee crisis in 2015. 
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Figure 9. Share of parliamentary motions on "Freedom of religion" of the total amount of 
parliamentary motions from 2011 to 2020 
 
The percentage of parliamentary motions on “Freedom of religion” also showed an increasing 
trend, as presented in Figure 9. The percentage increased from 0.41% in 2011 to 1.32% in 
2020, meaning an increase of 221.95%. There has been a rather stable increase, but with two 
years of major increases (2014 and 2018). The increase starts from a low level in 2011, which 
should be taken into consideration when considering the increase up to 2020. But even so, the 
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2011 4 2 0 1 1 8 
2012 6 4 0 2 0 12 
2013 5 4 0 1 0 10 
2014 8 3 0 0 3 14 
2015 4 4 1 0 4 13 
2016 4 5 0 1 1 11 
2017 5 5 0 3 2 15 
2018 4 8 1 3 2 18 
2019 4 8 3 2 1 18 
2020 8 12 1 2 2 25 
  
  
Of the total amount of the 318 parliamentary motions on “Freedom of religion” between 2011 
and 2020, 144 was found using centralizing and purposive sampling to be of interest for the 
qualitative idea analysis in this study. The categorization of them is stapled and presented in 
Table 1, where these 144 motions represented all years in the study. The findings show an 
overall increase in the number of parliamentary motions on “Freedom from religion, and a 
stable development on parliamentary motions on “Freedom to religion”. Motions explicitly 
on Freedom from religion were stable during 2011-2017, only to increase drastically from 
2018 to 2020. Several parliamentary parties were represented in these motions. The two 
standout parliamentary parties were the Christian Democrats (CD) and the Sweden 
Democrats (SD), but The Moderate Party (M) was also represented in a large matter. The 
Liberal Party (L), The Left Party (LP), and The Social Democrats (S) were also represented 
in the motions. 
  
Now I will turn to the results of the idea analysis of the parliamentary motions on “Freedom 
from religion” and on “Freedom to religion”, in order to understand if the proposals presented 
in them are increasing in strength and comprehensiveness. Since the motions are written in 
Swedish, I have translated all quotes. 
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Freedom to religion 
The amount of parliamentary motions on Freedom to religion is not changing to any large 
extent, but the ideas that the motions are built upon is. Parliamentary motions on Freedom to 
religion is mostly focusing on the prosecution and protection of Christians. In the early years 
of the data, the focus was mainly internationally, on foreign policy and the work in the UN 
and the EU. This is mainly due to the ongoing situation in the Middle East and the Syrian war 
leading to that many Christians fled the region. Many of these parliament motions are holding 
Freedom to religion very high, and asks for more work by the Swedish government, 
exemplified in this parliamentary motion from the Christian Democrats: 
  
With this in mind, the Swedish government, in its contacts with those in power in the Middle East, must 
be quick to affirm the right to protection of individuals and religious minorities against any act of 
persecution due to religious affiliation. (Motion 2013/14:U254) 
  
There are also recurrent parliamentary motions through the years that focus on the issue that 
Sweden is not taking Freedom to religion seriously enough, not in the international nor the 
national arena, and that Swedes have a hard time understanding the prosecution of religious 
people in other parts of the world, which is visualized in the parliamentary motion from M: 
  
Like the other fundamental freedoms, Freedom of religion is something that everyone benefits from, 
because it creates the conditions for peace, democratization, development and other human rights (...) It 
is easy to take Freedom of religion for granted, and it can be difficult for us who live in Sweden to 
familiarize ourselves with the conditions that millions of people experience every day. (Motion 
2012/13:U259) 
  
This quote points towards the idea that the Swedish population is having a hard time 
understanding that many suffer from prosecution due to their religious faith, highlighting the 
idea that Sweden is a secular country with not only non-existing religious persecution, but 
with a primarily non-religious population that is lacking knowledge on the issue. In this 
parliamentary motion though, the argument is used to argue for an enhanced focus on the 
issue internationally: 
  
Sweden should to a greater extent than today prioritize issues of Freedom of religion, as this also 
provides better conditions for achieving results in other foreign policy priorities (...) One way to seriously 
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integrate the issue is to create the conditions for, implement and report the results of an active integration 
of Freedom of religion issues in foreign policy and development cooperation. (Motion 2012/13:U259) 
  
The parliamentary motions focusing on the international arena are growing in both strength 
and comprehensiveness during the years covered in this study. There are calls for new 
country strategies for international programs in aid and education in Freedom of religion for 
all Swedish diplomats working abroad (Motion 2019/20:3157), based on “the fact that a 
majority of the world’s population describes themselves as religious and that religious 
leaders often inspire the greatest trust among different groups”. There are also calls for that 
all work through SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) should focus more on 
Freedom to religion (Motion 2019/20:38) and that Sweden should appoint a UN delegate 
(Motion 2019/20:1280) and an ambassador (Motion 2018/19:2777) on Freedom of religion. 
The UN delegate should have the mission to “map the threats and persecution against 
Christian residents and with the task of developing an action plan to protect and secure the 
existence of Christian residents in several places in the world...” (Motion 2019/20:1280), and 
the ambassador on Freedom of religion should be able to “make demands when trade 
agreements are concluded, or condemn regimes that oppress religious minorities” (Motion 
2018/19:2777). These parliamentary motions show the increase in strength and 
comprehensiveness that motions on Freedom to religion have during 2011-2020. 
  
Up until 2016, the focus was mostly internationally, but from 2016 it was also directed at a 
national level, and the protection of Christian refugees arriving in Sweden during the 
European refugee crisis is addressed both by S and CD (Motion 2016/17:1867, Motion 
2016/17:3398), an issue addressed every year up to 2020. In 2020, CD also filed a 
parliamentary motion with the proposal of a national investigation regarding Christophobia, 
where they call to “promptly initiate a survey of Swedish Christophobia, including analysis of 
the underlying causes and proposals for measures against ignorance, prejudice and hate 
crimes with Chrostophobic motives” (Motion 2020/21:491). Apart from this, there are 
parliamentary motions almost every year lifting that fact that Freedom of conscience is part 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that it should be discussed in Sweden as 
well, focusing on nurses’ obligation to conduct abortion. 
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Freedom from religion 
Unlike the parliamentary motions on Freedom to religion, the amount of motions on Freedom 
from religion has been increasing, especially since 2018. The overall theme of these motions 
during the last decade has been regarding different prohibitions against religious actions from 
Muslims. SD is in 2012 the only parliament party calling for a ban of Islamic call for prayer 
in all of Sweden, a motion that returns with minor or zero changes every year since. This 
motion is formed around the idea that Islam is not compatible with the Swedish values, since 
Sweden is a historically Christian characterized country, a fact that cannot be ignored: 
  
Freedom of religion is also a freedom from coercion, a freedom from religious expression and religious 
propaganda in the public sphere. The latter is also particularly relevant as Islam has time and time again 
proved to be incompatible with our Western values of, for example, democracy and gender equality. 
(Motion 2012/13:K356) 
  
In 2018, CD also started to write motions problematizing the Islamic call to prayer (Motion 
2018/19:1751). The right to not adhere to any religion is clear in this motion, in a way that 
has not been seen in the party’s motions earlier: 
  
(…) and Freedom of religion is also the right to not have a religious belief. One should be able to choose 
to refrain from being repeatedly met with religious creeds and pressure. People should therefore not 
involuntarily have to hear regular prayer calls when being at home or out in their own residential area. 
(Motion 2018/19:1751) 
  
In this motion, and several other motions on the issue written years earlier and years later, it 
is not uncommon that the Islamic call for prayer is compared to the Christian church bells. 
The argument in the motions is that the difference between them is big since the Islamic call 
to prayer is not just a call to prayer, but also a message to the whole residential area that they 
belong to the religion. It is also common with arguments in motions that faith is a private 
matter, and only a private matter, and that the individual adhering to any religion should 
hence conduct religious matters on private grounds. In some motions, it is suggested that 
refugees arriving in Sweden must have known that Sweden is a secular country (sometimes 
the phrase “secular society” is used) and that that is the reason they choose to migrate to 
Sweden. The overall call for in motions is that the Islamic call to prayer should be prohibited 
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since it violates people's Freedom from religion and that it hinders the integration of Muslims 
into Swedish society. 
  
Another phenomenon that gets increasingly mentioned is children's right to not be forced into 
religion and their right to not encounter religion in schools. SD is first to mention the issue 
between 2011 and 2020 when they 2013 argued that private confessional schools should be 
prohibited to conduct religious activities during school time (Motion 2013/14:Ub582). In 
2016, the argument in parliamentary motions from SD on the issue has changed. Now the call 
for a ban of all confessional schools, and a ban for religious organisations to run schools 
(Motion 2016/17:2257). The idea is that confessional schools hinder the integration of 
immigrant children and second-generation immigrants since they oppose the Swedish secular 
tradition which has made Sweden immune to negative religious impact on the society, such 
as religious fanaticism, honor-based violence, oppression of women, antisemitism, etc. That 
is why there needs to be a ban on all confessional schools: 
  
We can in no way let faith take the precedence over science or accept that groups of people are relegated 
to a community based on religious fundamentalism. Society today needs tools to reduce segregation, not 
increase it, which is why confessional schools are directly inappropriate (...) To ensure functioning 
integration of new arrivals and their children in the society, as well as strengthen the humanistic parts of 
the school curriculum, the government should therefore ban all confessional independent schools in 
Sweden. (Motion 2016/17:2257) 
  
SD is hence going from calling for a ban of religious activities during school time for 
confessional schools in 2013 to calling for the ban of confessional schools entirely in 2016. 
This is an increasing development in both strength and comprehensiveness. In 2020, S 
(Motion 2020/21:1474) calls for a ban of confessional schools with similar arguments. In a 
motion from LP in 2017 (Motion 2017/18:2339), the call for a ban of all confessional schools 
and for all religious symbols in schools was made. Their overall idea is similar to SD’s, that it 
hinders integration and democratic development in the country. LP though adds the reason 
that confessional schools hinder religious children to exercise their faith. In another motion 
from LP (Motion 2017/18:3186) it is argued that schools should not bond to any ideology or 
religion, but be based on science and “... on the equal value of all people, which some schools 
today are not. When girls and boys are already separated on the bus on the way to and from 
school (...) the school’s curriculum falls”. This separation of boys and girls is in other 
motions from LP called “gender apartheid” (Motions 2018/19:370) and is pointing towards 
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the other main argument for prohibiting confessional schools - the equality problem between 
boys and girls and the violation of girls’ human rights through religious constraints. Overall, 
more parliament parties, and more motions from these parties, calls for the ban of 
confessional schools, increasing the issue in strength and comprehensiveness. 
  
In a motion from 2012, SD was the first party in this study’s time frame to call for a ban of 
Islamic veils for girls in public schools. The idea in this motion is similar to ideas in the 
upcoming motions calling for a ban of the Islamic veil up until 2020, revolving around the 
idea that the Islamic veil is a religious symbol that sexualize and oppresses women and girls, 
which is exemplified well here: 
  
The Islamic veil is a symbol with both a strong religious and political message, with a meaning that goes 
against the Western values of men and women's equal value. Its purpose is to cover girls and women in 
order to not arouse the desires of men. This is an approach that both objectifies all women and considers 
men as primitive beings whose sexual drive cannot be controlled. This in itself is a view of humans we in 
no way can stand behind. In addition, when young girls are also expected to wear this symbol, this means 
nothing more than that the sexualized objectification is already applied to girl children. This is of course 
completely unacceptable in a society that stands up for children’s right to be children. (Motion 
2012/13:A394) 
  
SD was first with parliamentary motions problematizing Islamic veils on children, and they 
were the only parliament party with parliament motions until 2019 when a motion from M 
also brought it up as an issue. In 2019 and 2020, M wrote motions calling for a governmental 
investigation on the prohibition of Islamic veils on girls in preschools and elementary schools 
(Motion 2019/20:3374, Motion 2020/21:3514). In the motions, it is argued that many 
countries are standing up for women's freedom in their ban of Islamic veils in elementary 
schools, and that Sweden should consider doing that as well. They point out that this has 
nothing at all to do with Freedom of religion or immigration hostility, but that: 
  
The Islamic veil is basically a symbol of oppression of women. Hair and body are covered so that girls 
and women do not arouse the desire of men (...) Why should we allow a symbol that discriminates half of 
the world's population? We must not be so tolerant that we tolerate the intolerant. (Motion 
2019/2020:3374) 
  
But parliament motions on Islamic veils are not limited to schools. In 2018, L (Motion 
2018/19:2923) wrote under the title “The limits of Freedom of religion” that employers 
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should be able to restrict specific clothing if necessary, and SD (Motion 2020/21:639) wrote a 
motion that all governmental work should be neutral, meaning that religious clothing should 
be forbidden. In 2018, CD (Motion 2018/19:2972) calls for an investigation on the legislation 
on discrimination, since it is not clear enough in regards to religious aspects. In the motion, it 
is argued that religious people consider themselves discriminated against when they cannot 
use Islamic veils at work or when they do not want to greet others through the use of 
handshakes, which is a problem since it should not be a case of discrimination. The Swedish 
habit of “ greeting each other by looking in the eyes and taking each other by the hand” is a 
sign of respect and a sign of gender equality, which creates trust and cohesion between 
people (Motion 2018/19:2972). In the motion, it is argued that employers should be able to 
deny employment to people not accepting these habits, and the argument is based on the idea 
that “Freedom of religion, for example, is also the right to not have or convey a religious 
belief”. Apart from this, in 2016 M (Motion 2016/17:3547) wrote a motion calling for that 
the exception to the masking ban on sport contexts based on religion should be removed since 
it can be used by non-religious people in order to cover their face while conducting illegal 
matters. The problematization of Islamic veils is overall increasing in strength and 
comprehensiveness by being mentioned by more parties and in more areas in society. 
  
In 2019, a motion from SD (Motion 2019/20:3195) called for a change in the Swedish 
constitution, so that it is clearly states that Sweden is a secular country. In the same motion, it 
is called for a change in the legislation on Freedom of religion, so that it becomes clear that it 
also includes Freedom from religion (in a similar motion from 2020, the call for change in the 
constitution on Sweden as a secular country is erased (Motion 2020/21:2882)). It is argued in 
the motion that religion has been given a special position in Swedish society. The idea is that 
faith only exists collectively and that it is in opposition to science. There are clear indicators 
that religion has become something that is considered a problem in society: 
  
Faith is based on the fact that a number of people collectively is believing it to be true, but it can 
disappear if the common perception ceases. In other words, unlike science, it exists only because there is 
a belief, not because it is facts. Despite the fact that the vast majority agree with this, religion has been 
given a special position in society. (Motion 2019/2020:3195) 
  
In the motion, it is stated that special treatment on a religious basis is happening in the 
Swedish secular society, and that this is a big problem. For instance, examples when it comes 
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to gender equality and for the Freedom of religion, meaning Freedom from religion is brought 
up. It is stated in the motion that: “Religion is a private matter, but when religion becomes 
politics, it is no longer a private matter, then it concerns everyone. For a secular country like 
Sweden, it is extremely important that politics and religion are kept separate in the 
legislation” (Motion 2019/2020:3195). Sweden is portrayed as one of the most secular 
countries in the world, but that the Swedish Christian heritage, and hence Swedish values, are 
important for Swedes, while religion in its essence is to be considered history. These are 
proposals that raise the strength and comprehensiveness even higher regarding the issue of 
religion since it is a change in the constitution and in one of the strongest human rights in the 
Swedish legislation. Islam or Muslims are not mentioned in the motion, but it is obvious that 
the issue is primarily here. Specially adapted food in public catering, gender-segregated 
activities, or offensive and recurring propaganda from a certain religion in loudspeakers is 
mentioned, pointing clearly to Islam. And there are more parliamentary motions on Freedom 
from religion that does not single out any religion, motions that are covering areas such as 
stricter control or prohibition of religious schools, prohibition of religious symbols in 
schools, the end of school graduations in Swedish Churches, and stop of state contribution to 
religious organization overall or to specific religious organizations that do not follow and 
adhere to democratic values. No religion is singled out in these parliamentary motions, but 
the fact that the different areas to which they are focusing are increasing, that they are 
growing in total numbers, that the amount of parliament parties writing these motions are 
increasing in total numbers, and that most of this development happens after 2015 makes the 
claim that the European refugee crisis and the increasing Muslim migration to Sweden have 
sparked the political debate on and increased the politicisation of religion and Freedom of 
religion more valid. 
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Analysis 
In this chapter, the analysis of the findings will be conducted. First, the focus will be on the 
quantitative findings where a content analysis will test the first and the second hypotheses. 
Second, the focus will be on the quantitative findings on “Freedom of religion”, and then on 
the qualitative idea analysis in order to test the third hypothesis. 
  
The first hypothesis in this study was two fold - first that political parties’ references to 
religion in general would increase, and secondly that the increase would be more significant 
in other religions than Christianity. The data indicate that there is support for both of these 
statements, and hence for the first hypothesis. The percentage of parliamentary motions on 
“Religion” increased from 35.28% in 2011 to 41.29% in 2020, meaning an increase of 
17.04%. As seen in Figure 4, the motions on “Religion” first started to increase in 2015, 
coming from a few years of stable numbers. This has an interesting correlation with the peak 
of the European refugee crisis in 2015. Parliamentary motions on “Christianity” also 
increased during the period investigated. In 2011, the percentage of motions was 8.26%, 
which increasing to 9.91% in 2020, meaning an increase of 19.98% during this period. As 
seen in Figure 5, most of the increase came during three years - 2013, 2015, and 2020. Apart 
from this, there was a drastic decrease in 2014 and a minor decreasing trend occurring from 
2016 to 2018. Unlike the motions on “Religion”, there was no visible correlation to the 
European refugee crisis in 2015. The parliamentary motions on “Islam” had a much faster 
development. From a percentage of 1.07% in 2011 to a percentage of 3.38% in 2020, the 
increase was 174.8%. Looking at Figure 6, it is visible that the increase was rather stable 
during this period, with the only noticeable major increase in 2015 and 2018, and a minor 
decrease in 2017 and 2019. The increase in 2015 is especially interesting due to the European 
refugee crisis that year. Looking at the parliamentary motions on “Judaism”, the increasing 
trend also occurred there. In 2011, the percentage was 0.59%, which increased to 1.35% in 
2020. This means that the motions on “Judaism” increased by 128.81% during this period. 
Visible in Figure 7, almost all of the increase occurred between 2016 and 2018, with rather 
stable development before and after those years, but on a higher level after. It is important to 
note that the increase of parliamentary motions on “Islam” and especially on “Judaism” 
started from a low level in 2011, making the percentage increase more intense than for 
“Christianity”, which started at a much higher level. This means that the comparison between 
the different religions needs to be done with care. Interestingly, the percentage increase 
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during the last decade is much stronger for “Islam” than it is for “Judaism”, even though the 
percentage of motions on “Judaism” in 2011 was much lower than for “Islam” the same year. 
Noted here, parliamentary motions on “Judaism” were on a stable level up until 2016, just to 
more than double the percentage between 2016 and 2018. Even though the comparison is 
difficult, parliamentary motions on “Judaism” and in particular on “Islam”, has increased 
faster than parliamentary motions on “Christianity”. Parliamentary motions on “Religion” 
overall also increased, which means that there is support for the first hypothesis. 
  
The second hypothesis was stipulated towards the issue of migration and its correlations with 
the issue of religion. In order to test if the correlation increased or not during the last decade, 
I measured the percentage of parliamentary motions on both “Religion” and “Migration” of 
the total amount of parliamentary motions. In 2011, the percentage was 5.95%, which 
increased to 10.23% in 2020. This means that during this period motions on “Religion” and 
“Migration” increased by 71.93%. But as can be seen in Figure 8, almost all increase 
occurred in 2015. From a percentage of 5.56% in 2014, it increased to a percentage of 12.4%, 
which means that motions on “Religion” and “Migration” increased by 123.02% the year the 
European refugee crisis peaked. In 2016 the percentage decreased to 9.42% but has since 
been slowly increasing up to 2020, staying on a much higher level than before 2015. The 
drastic development in 2015 indicates that the European refugee crisis had an instant impact 
on the amount of parliamentary motions connecting the issue of migration with the issue of 
religion. The data found shows that there is support for the second hypothesis. 
  
The third hypothesis was stipulated against the issue of Freedom of religion, where I 
expected to find that parliament parties’ references to Freedom of religion had increased, and 
that the parties increasingly emphasized Freedom from religion more than Freedom to 
religion. This hypothesis was tested both quantitatively and qualitatively. First, I measured 
the percentage of parliamentary motions on “Freedom of religion” of the total amount of 
parliamentary motions, in line with how I measured the parliamentary motions on the first 
and second hypotheses. Visible in Figure 9, the parliamentary motions on “Freedom of 
religion” saw a clear increase during the last decade. From 2011 and a percentage of 0.41% to 
2020 and a percentage of 1.32%, the increase was 221.95%. The increase started from a low 
level of percentage in 2011, making the increase look very fast in percentage. Even though it 
is, it should not without care be compared to other percentage increases presented earlier in 
this study. However, this development supports the first part of the hypothesis.  
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Next, the qualitative findings presented in Table 1 show an overall increase in the amount of 
parliamentary motions on “Freedom from religion”, and stable development on parliamentary 
motions on “Freedom to religion”. While the amount of parliamentary motions on Freedom 
to religion is not changing to any large extent between 2011 and 2020, there is a change in 
the ideas that are presented in the motions. First of all, the focus was to a large extent on 
Christians. In the first years of the time frame, the proposals in the motions were primarily 
directed towards international work, in the UN, and the EU. The Syrian war and the situation 
in the Middle East led to Christian refugees that according to the motions were not taken 
seriously enough by the Swedish government. Education in Freedom of religion for all 
Swedish diplomats working abroad, more focus on religion in all work done by SIDA, and 
the appointment of a UN delegate and an ambassador on Freedom of religion were all 
proposals which should enhance the work on the rights contained in Freedom of religion. 
From 2016 and onwards, the proposals in the motions were also directed nationally, towards 
the protection of Christian refugees arriving in Sweden. In 2020, a proposal of a national 
investigation on Christophobia was argued for in a motion. 
  
The overall focus is that the issue of religion, with a focus on Freedom to religion, has been 
neglected by Sweden, both internationally and nationally, which is visible in the 
parliamentary motions on Freedom to religion used in this study. It is also clear that it is 
Christianity that is threatened, and Christians that are persecuted both internationally and 
nationally. The proposals in these motions overall are to enhance the discussion on the issue 
of Freedom of religion in all areas of politics, to demand more protection of Christians 
internationally, and to protect Christian refugees arriving in Sweden during the European 
refugee crisis. The parliamentary motions are increasing in strength and comprehensiveness 
on many levels, and from 2016 onwards, the focus is not only internationally but also on 
Sweden, which likely has been affected by the European refugee crisis and the increasing 
amount of Muslim immigrants. 
  
While the amount of motions on Freedom to Religion did not change to any large extent, the 
opposite was true for motions on Freedom from Religion. From 2011 to 2020 it increased, 
especially from 2018 and onwards. The overall theme was different prohibition against 
religious action from Muslims. As presented in the results, all these proposals increased in 
strength and comprehensiveness during the time frame. The prohibition of the Islamic call for 
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prayer intensified both in argument and in scope, and increased in both the number of parties 
and amount of motions suggesting it. The same could be said for the issue of confessional 
schools, as the proposals went from stricter control to prohibition, and for a ban of Islamic 
veils on girls in schools. The main argument for these proposals of prohibition was that it 
goes against the right to avoid facing religion in everyday life, against gender equality, and 
that it hinders the integration into the Swedish society. These proposals of prohibition are 
motivated by what Ivanescu (2010) found to be the primary driving force of politicisation of 
religion, namely willingness from the country to integrate the immigrants, and by what she 
found to be secondary, namely Muslims collective and public expression of their faith. Other 
proposals, such as that all governmental work should be neutral and free from religious 
clothing, was motivated by the argument that religion is a private matter that individuals 
should practice in their private time and space. This privatisation of religion in secular 
countries such as Sweden has led to problems of integration of Muslim immigrants, which is 
what Sigurdson (2009) and Casanova (2007) are highlighting, as discussed earlier in this 
study. 
  
The clearest sign of increased strength and comprehensiveness in proposals on prohibition in 
motions on Freedom from Religion came in 2019 and 2020 when motions were written with 
the proposal of changing the constitution in the way making it clear that Sweden is a secular 
country, and of changing the legislation of Freedom of religion so that it includes the term 
Freedom from Religion. In this motion, and many other motions, Muslims or Islam were not 
mentioned. Even so, there are clear signs that the issue is directed towards them, as activities 
in schools where boys and girls are separated, special food in public catering, and offensive 
and recurring propaganda from religious loudspeakers are some of the problems highlighted 
in them. Overall, the findings indicate that parliament motions on Freedom from religion are 
increasing in strength and comprehensiveness in the proposals of prohibition, and that 
parliament parties increasingly emphasize “Freedom from religion” more than “Freedom to 
religion”, during the time frame of this study. 
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Concluding discussion 
The religious landscape in Sweden is changing. Globalization and increased Muslim 
migration have increased the religious pluralism in Sweden, and the political parties in the 
Swedish parliament are reacting to it. This study has been investigating how this materializes 
in parliament motions between 2011 and 2020, connecting the issue of religion to the issue of 
migration. The purpose was to understand to what extent parties in the Swedish Parliament 
politicise religion due to the migration of Muslims, and was intended to contribute to the 
knowledge on how religion is used in politics, contributing to the ongoing discussion on the 
‘return’ of religion in politics by connecting the issue to the refugee crisis in 2015. 
  
Three hypotheses were stipulated and tested: (1) The parliament parties’ reference to religion 
in general, and to other religions than Christianity in particular, has increased, (2) the 
parliament parties’ reference has been increasingly related to the issue of migration, and (3) 
the parliament parties reference to Freedom of religion has increased, and the parties are 
increasingly emphasizing Freedom from religion more than Freedom to religion. The data, 
and the analysis conducted upon it, was found to be supporting all three hypotheses, but with 
some caveats. 
  
As seen in Figure 4, the parliament parties in Sweden are increasingly bringing up the issue 
of religion, and the data found is showing a rather substantial development. Interestingly, the 
increasing development is first starting in 2015 indicating a correlation to the European 
refugee crisis. Looking at the different religions included in this study, “Christianity”, 
“Islam” and “Judaism”, it is clear that neither “Christianity” nor “Judaism”, Figure 5 and 
Figure 7, is the driving force in that change in 2015 and 2016, but rather “Islam” as seen in 
Figure 6. This also indicates that a correlation to the refugee crisis, with its increasing 
Muslim migration. Parliamentary motions on “Judaism” saw a fast increase between 2017-
2018. Even though the increasing amount of motions are a fact, there are some problems with 
comparing the different religions to each other. Parliamentary motions on both “Islam” and 
“Judaism” are on a much lower percentage level of the total amount of parliamentary motions 
than “Christianity” is, making their increase in percentage much bigger. This weakens the 
quality of the first hypothesis, since a comparison between the three religions is difficult. 
Even so, the trend is clear and the data suggest that hypothesis 1 is supported. Looking at the 
motions on “Religion” and “Migration”, seen in Figure 8, the increasing correlation between 
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the issue of religion and the issue of migration becomes even more clear. The drastically 
increasing amount of motions on the issue of religion and the issue of migration combined 
that occurred in 2015 is a clear sign of change. But since the refugee crisis was such an 
important event, most issues probably increased in correlation to the issue of migration this 
year. The increase is though significant, and the fact that the percentage remained at a much 
higher level after 2015 indicates support for the second hypothesis. 
  
The parliament parties’ references to Freedom of religion also increased during this period, as 
seen in Figure 9. A big proportion of the increase happened in 2014, making the correlation 
to the European refugee crisis non-existent. The fact that it stayed on these high levels after 
2014 and increased even more since 2018, indicates that the increasing relevance of Freedom 
of religion is here to stay. Looking at Table 1, it is also clear that parliament parties are 
increasingly focusing on Freedom from religion while Freedom to religion is remaining on a 
stable level. The analysis of the parliamentary motions on Freedom to religion also showed 
that the proposals in the motions are increasing in both strength and comprehensiveness 
during this period. Motions on Freedom to religion is demanding more focus on the issue of 
religion both internationally - with education for diplomats and integration of the issue of 
religion in the work done by the government in other countries, and stronger protection of 
persecuted Christians - and nationally - with better protection of Christians being persecuted, 
mostly focusing on Christian refugees arriving during the European refugee crisis in 2015 or 
afterwards. Motions on Freedom from religion are increasing in its prohibition of particularly 
Muslim attributes. While the proposal of prohibiting Islamic call to prayer and Islamic veils 
on girls in schools or on women in different workplaces are obviously directed at Islam, the 
proposal of controlling or prohibiting confessional schools is more or less also clearly 
directed at Islam due to the argument for it - that it is better for successful integration. 
Invanescu’s (2010) study on politicisation of religion, with a focus on Islam and Muslims, 
showed that it was primarily this willingness to integrate Muslim migrants that increased 
politicisation of religion in the Netherlands, and the idea that Islam is a religion expressed 
collectively and publicly was only secondary. This separation was difficult to do in this study, 
but both of these aspects were clearly part of the politicisation of religion found in this study. 
The proposal of changing the constitution in a way making it clear that Sweden is a secular 
country and changing the Swedish legislation on Freedom of religion, where the term 
Freedom from religion was proposed to be included, is also a clear sign of increased emphasis 
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on Freedom from religion, and a clear increase in strength and comprehensiveness. All things 
covered, the data and the analysis indicates that there is support for the third hypothesis. 
  
In Lindberg’s study (2014) on politicisation of religion in Scandinavia during 1988-2009, he 
found that Sweden was the one country that did not have a substantial increase during this 
period. Both Norway and Denmark did though, and Lindberg concluded that globalization 
and migration were not the driving force for increased politicisation of religion, but rather a 
right-wing populist party in the Parliament (Lindberg, 2014, p. 581). Hence, Lindberg 
predicted a similar development occurring in Sweden from 2010, when the Sweden 
Democrats entered the Swedish Parliament. This study found this prediction to be true, but 
the increasing development did not really pick up speed until 2015 and the European refugee 
crisis, making the case that migration did have a part in the increasing politicisation of 
religion during the last decade, unlike the two decades before investigated by Lindberg. 
  
The time frame used in this study might have had some unintended implications for the data 
used. Since the Sweden Democrats first entered the parliament in 2010, members of the 
parliament from that party could start writing motions in 2011. Hence, the amount of motions 
overall could have increased from that year. Also relevant to this is that the party had a major 
part of the total amount of motions on the issue of religion. This does not have any 
implication on the trend from 2011 and forward, hence not having a negative impact on this 
study, but comparisons to data on parliamentary motions before that could become a skewed. 
Future research on politicisation of religion should most certainly find value in other material 
than parliamentary motions, for instance party programs and parliamentary debates, and in 
connecting the issue of religion to other issues than migration. Also, this study has not had its 
focus on how the different political parties in the Swedish Parliament politicise religion, even 
though it has not neglected to mention its relevance. Going forward, analyzing how parties 
according to ideological tradition use religion in politics is much relevant in order to increase 
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